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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 20000707-CA

ROBERT TODD BROWN,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a guilty plea to one count of
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony.
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1999).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

By asking defendant to come over and talk to him, did

the officer violate defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free
from an unreasonable seizure?
Whether an encounter with the police constitutes a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment is a legal conclusion, reviewed for
correctness. As with a reasonable suspicion determination, the
trial court is accorded a "measure of discretion" in applying the
standard.

Salt Lake Citv v. Ray, 2000 UT App. 55, 1 8, 998 P.2d

274 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)).

2.

Should this Court review the scope of a search where

defendant explicitly waived his right to appeal the matter as
part of a favorable plea negotiation and where, as a result of
the plea negotiation, the trial court never ruled on the matter?
Where an issue has not been ruled upon by the trial court,
no standard of review applies.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Resolution of the single issue properly before the Court
requires analysis of no constitutional provisions, statutes, or
rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a first degree felony;
one count of possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a
second degree felony; and one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor (R. 5-7) . The offenses all
occurred within 1000 feet of a church and followed a previous
conviction for possession of a controlled substance.

Id.

Following a preliminary hearing and bindover on all charges,
defendant filed a motion to suppress (R. 26-32).

After an

evidentiary hearing on the motion, the trial court ruled that the
initial stop was proper but that it would defer a decision on the
scope of the search pending further briefing by the parties (R.
57: 26-27) . Prior to any further ruling from the court,

2

defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to a single third
degree felony, preserving his right to appeal only the legality
of the initial stop (Id. at 28). This timely appeal followed (R.
53-54) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In June of 1999, Officer James Gent of the Ogden City Police
Department stopped a motorcycle in front of an apartment building
because the vehicle's registration had expired (Tr. 5)- 1 The
driver, Rocco Colantonio, said he was test-driving the motorcycle
and that the owner was in his apartment (Id. at 5, 13). Rocco's
girlfriend then emerged from the apartment to see what was going
on.

She confirmed both Rocco1s identity and the presence of the

owner in the apartment.

She then went back inside to convey a

request by the officer to speak to the owner about the expired
registration (Id. at 6).

A few minutes later, she returned and

told the officer, "*[H]e won't come out. He doesn't want to talk
to you'" (Id. at 7).

The officer thought this was "kind of

suspicious" (Id.).
Minutes later, a few neighborhood eight-year-olds came
running up to the officer and told him that "a white man in a
blue t-shirt" had just jumped out of Rocco's apartment window and

1

The abbreviation, uTr.", refers to the preliminary
hearing transcript of May 11, 2000, which has not been paginated
for purposes of this appeal.
3

had taken off running (Id. at 7, 13) .2 The officer searched the
area but could not locate the individual (R. 7 ) .
Two hours later, as Officer Gent was driving by the same
apartment, he noticed a white man in a blue shirt knocking on the
door of Rocco Colantonio's apartment (Id. at 7-8, 15). As the
officer made a U-turn and came back to park, he saw the man,
defendant, walk toward a parked vehicle.

When the officer

stopped and stepped from his marked police car, defendant uturned
around and quickly went the other way" (Id. at 8 ) . Officer Gent
"called to him and asked him to come talk to me" (Id.).
Defendant approached Officer Gent, who later testified that
defendant "was just shaking.
forehead.

I could see sweat forming on his

He was just very unusually nervous" (Id. at 9).

Defendant held a large cardboard cup in his right hand, and he
kept putting his left hand in his front pocket (Id.).

Although

the officer told him repeatedly to remove his hand from his
pocket, defendant continued to put it back in.

From this, the

officer concluded that "there was obviously something in his
pocket that he doesn't want me to know about or something that he
needs to keep his hand on and that raised my suspicion and my

2

Suspecting the man who jumped from the apartment window
was the owner of the motorcycle, the officer commented at the
preliminary hearing, "I thought it was kind of unusual that
someone would jump out the window instead of just coming out to
talk to me" (Tr. 7 ) .
4

concern for my safety" (Id.).

The officer elaborated, "Well, he

could have had a weapon in his pocket . . . and he's already got
his hand on it. He's got the jump on me" (Id.).
The officer explained to defendant that he was going to
conduct a weapons search (Id.).

In doing so, the officer felt

money in defendant's pocket and then a hard square box which was
ultimately found to contain both methamphetamines and marijuana
(Tr. at 10, 17/ R. 57: 5).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant appears to argue that the trial court erred in
determining that the officer's initial stop of defendant was a
consensual encounter.

The facts demonstrate, however, that the

police officer merely called to defendant, asking him to "come
talk to me" (Tr. at 8). The record demonstrates that the remark
was uttered as a request.
coercion.

There is no evidence suggesting

Under the circumstances, the trial court correctly

determined that the

stop did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.

Further, even if the Court were to interpret the stop as a level
two seizure, it was supported by reasonable suspicion.

Two hours

earlier, when the officer had tried to follow up on an expired
motorcycle registration, the owner had refused to come out of an
apartment to talk with him.

Some children had then reported a

white man in a blue shirt jumping out a window of the same
apartment and running away.

When the officer saw a man meeting

5

that description knocking on the same apartment door, he had
reasonable suspicion to detain him for a brief investigation.

As

either a consensual level one encounter or a level two detention,
then, the trial court properly determined that the officer was
justified in stopping defendant.
Additionally, defendant argues that the officers exceeded
the scope of a proper search for weapons and that, consequently,
all contraband seized as a result of the unconstitutional search
should be suppressed.

This argument fails at the outset because

it is not properly before this Court for review.

While defendant

raised the issue in his suppression motion, he subsequently chose
not to invoke a ruling on it for tactical reasons. By foregoing
a ruling, he was able to negotiate a favorable plea bargain,
which was specifically conditioned on preserving the right to
challenge only the propriety of the initial stop.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED
THAT DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECT TO A
CONSENSUAL LEVEL ONE ENCOUNTER
WHERE THE POLICE OFFICER MERELY
ASKED DEFENDANT TO COME TALK TO
HIM; ALTERNATIVELY, THE STOP COULD
BE JUSTIFIED BASED ON REASONABLE
SUSPICION
Defendant appears to argue that the trial court erred in
determining that Officer Gent's initial stop of defendant
constituted a level one encounter.
6

See Br. of App. at 9.

To the

extent that defendant makes this argument, it must fail.
In ruling on the initial stop, the trial court stated:
I don't have any problems with this case
insofar as the initial stop. A level one
stop, complying with the law. I don't even
have any problems with the fact that - that
based on the description of this person and
the - and his nervousness and his repeated
efforts to put his hand in his pocket despite
the officer telling him not to, that the
officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion
to detain him and to perform a weapons
search.
R. 57: 18.
In light of the record facts, the trial court correctly
ruled that the initial stop was a level one encounter.

The law

is well-settled that three levels of police encounters with the
public are constitutionally permissible:
"(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the 'detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if
the officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being
committed."
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)(per
curiam)(citations omitted).

This Court has stated that a seizure

for Fourth Amendment purposes does not occur during a level one
encounter, "when a police officer merely approaches an individual
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on the street and questions him, if the person is willing to
listen."

State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah App.

1987)(citation omitted).

A level one encounter is thus

voluntary, where a citizen may respond to questions posed by an
officer, but is nonetheless free to leave at any time.

State v.

Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App. 1990).
In this case, the record evidence demonstrates that the
initial stop of defendant was a level one consensual encounter.
Officer Gent stated that he saw defendant at Rocco Colantonio's
door and then made a U-turn and parked his patrol car (Tr. at 8).
He testified, "I called to [defendant] and asked him to come talk
to me" (Id.; accord id. at 15; R. 57: 4 ) . Defendant then
approached the officer (Id. at 9 ) .
At the suppression hearing, defense counsel explored the
tone of voice used by the officer in asking defendant to "come
talk."

While the record cannot reflect the precise tenor of the

remark, it does contain a compelling interpretive clue.

On cross

examination of Officer Gent, defense counsel stated, "Two hours
later you saw the defendant wearing a blue t-shirt, Mr,
Colantonio's front door, and based upon that, you - as he started
walking away from you, you said, come here.

I need to talk to

you" (R. 57: 4 ) . The officer responded, "Not exactly that way,
but - I didn't use that tone of voice" (Id.).
Later in the hearing, defendant argued that because Officer
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Gent had "commanded" -- rather than "requested" -- defendant to
talk with him, the encounter must necessarily be a level two
detention, subject to the Fourth Amendment (Id. at 8). The trial
court disagreed, stating, "But I don't think that's what Officer
Gent just said. . . . He challenged the tone of your voice and he
challenged the way that you even framed the word. . . " (Id. at
8-9).

Because the trial court was present to impartially judge

the import of the officer's testimony, its determination should
not be second-guessed by this Court on a cold appellate record.
See, e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); State v.
Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1240-41 (Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S.
979 (1993).
The record here thus indicates that Officer Gent merely
requested defendant to talk with him.

In addition, the record is

devoid of any evidence suggesting that Officer Gent was
accompanied by the threatening presence of other officers, or
that he displayed a weapon, or used words or physical actions to
compel defendant's presence.

See Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 87

(enumerating factors tending to indicate seizure has occurred);
State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994).
Factually, this case is quite similar to Deitman, where the
officer "called to defendants and asked if he could speak to
them.

They responded by crossing the street to his vehicle and

presented identification upon request."
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Deitman, 739 P.2d at

617.

Defendants raised no objection to the officer's request,

and the officer did not detain them against their will.

Id. at

618; accord Bountiful Citv v. Maestas. 788 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah
App. 1990) • The supreme court determined"that the facts in
Deitman gave rise to a level one consensual encounter and did not
implicate the Fourth Amendment.

Id.

With an essentially

identical fact pattern in this case, the result should be the
same.
Even if this Court were to interpret the stop as a level two
seizure, however, it would nonetheless be justified by the
officer's reasonable suspicion.

The standard for initially

detaining an individual in Utah has been codified:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999).

See also State v. Menke, 787

P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Carpena. 714 P.2d 674,
675 (Utah 1986).

In determining whether reasonable suspicion

exists, courts look to "specific and articulable facts, together
with rational inferences from those facts, which warrant the
intrusion."

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991).

If

reasonable suspicion exists, the officer whas not only the right
but the duty to make observations and investigations to determine
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whether the law is being violated; and if so, to take such
measures as are necessary in the enforcement of the law."

State

v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 1980)(quoting State v.
Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971
(1977)) .
In this case, the officer was trying to locate the owner of
a motorcycle with lapsed registration.

He was told, first, that

the owner was inside an apartment and second, upon further
inquiry, that the owner refused to come out and talk with him
(Tr. 5 at 5, -7, 13). The officer thought the refusal was "kind
of suspicious" (Id. at 7).

Moments later, some children reported

that a white man in a blue t-shirt had jumped from the apartment
window and run away, an activity the officer described as
"unusual" (Id. at 7, 13). Two hours later, the officer spotted a
man matching the children's description knocking at the door of
the same apartment (Id. at 7-8, 15). As soon as the man saw the
uniformed officer, he "turned around and quickly went the other
way" (II at 8) .
From this constellation of facts, the officer could
reasonably infer that the owner of the motorcycle was trying to
avoid the police and that the white man in the blue t-shirt who
jumped from the apartment window was both the owner of the
motorcycle and same person the officer saw knocking at the door
two hours later. Under these circumstances, the office had
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sufficient justification to stop defendant to at least ascertain
his identity and whether he was the owner of the motorcycle-

No

more is necessary to justify a brief investigatory detention
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, whether the initial stop of defendant was a consensual
level one encounter or a level two detention, this Court should
sustain the trial court's ruling.
POINT TWO
WHERE DEFENDANT EXPLICITLY WAIVED
HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL THE SCOPE OF
THE WEAPONS SEARCH AS PART OF HIS
PLEA NEGOTIATION AND WHERE TOE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT RULE ON THE
SCOPE OF THE SEARCH, THAT ISSUE IS
NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
Defendant argues that Officer Gent exceeded the proper scope
of a weapons search.

Accordingly, he contends, the search

violated the Fourth Amendment, the contrabatnd that the officer
ultimately found should have been suppressed, and defendant
should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and decide anew
whether or not he wishes to enter a plea (Br. of App. at 9, 1415) .
Defendant's argument is not properly before this Court.
After the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, the trial
court ruled that the initial stop by Officer Gent was a
consensual level one encounter (R. 57s 18). Expressing concern
about the scope of the subsequent weapons search, however, the
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trial court postponed a decision on that issue until it could
review the matter further (Id. at 23, 26) .
Two weeks later, the case was back on the court's calendar.
Substitute defense counsel opened the hearing by stating:
It's my understanding that there has been a
suppression motion . . . The court has ruled
on the issue of the stop . . . and you found
that the stop was proper. It's my
understanding that you had some other issues
[sic] that there's a briefing schedule for.
As a result of that, we've arrived at a
negotiation. [Defendant] is going to enter a
plea of guilty to possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, and the
other counts will be dismissed. We are
reserving the right to appeal your finding
with regard to the stop.
R. 57: 28. The prosecutor explained further that review of the
preliminary hearing tape had revealed ambiguity in certain
pivotal evidence concerning the search, thus prompting the State
to negotiate a plea with defendant (Id. at 29). Later in the
hearing, in the course of the plea colloquy, the following
exchange occurred:
The Court:

Do you understand that any
appeal that you file after
today with the exception of
one that has been referenced
in the plea bargain would be
very limited in scope. In
other words, there's not much
to appeal from on a plea of
guilty?

Def. Counsel:

Except that we are reserving
the right to appeal that one
issue.
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Defendant:

Yes.

The Court

As I understand, there is the
issue of whether there was a
proper level one stop, is
that what I understood was the
negotiation?

Prosecution:

That's correct, Your Honor.
You ruled in the alternative
that either it was a proper
level one stop or that there
was a reasonable suspicion for
the stop based on the
circumstances.

The Court:

Okay.

Prosecution:

And in my mind, that's the
issues [sic] that - that they
have a right to appeal.

The Court:

Very well.
your mind?

Defendant:

Yes, Your Honor.

Is that clear in

Id. at 31. Based on this understanding, defendant entered a plea
of guilty to one third-degree felony.

Id. at 34.

The law is well-settled that where a trial court does not
rule on a defense motion and defendant fails to invoke a ruling,
defendant waives the issue for purposes of appeal.

State v.

Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied 795 P.2d
1138 (Utah 1990).

Here, defendant did not invoke a ruling on the

scope of the search as raised in his suppression motion for a
tactical reason.

By foregoing a ruling on the matter, he was

able to negotiate a favorable plea with the State.
Indeed, defendant explicitly waived his right to appeal the
14

scope of the weapons search as part of the plea negotiation.
Under such circumstances, where defendant's strategy is plain on
its face and well-documented by the record, there can be no doubt
that defendant waived any challenge to the weapons search and
that the only issue properly preserved for appellate review is
the propriety of the initial stop.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
third degree felony conviction for possession of a controlled
substance.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this decision rests wholly on well-established law
and a formal opinion will add nothing new to the case law, the
state requests neither oral argument nor a published opinion.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this oil

day of November, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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